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Social experiments have been widely utilised in evaluations of social programmes in the
US to identify `what works', whilst in the UK their use is more controversial. This paper
explores the paradigmatic, technical and practical issues evaluators confront in using
randomised experiments to evaluate social policies. Possible remedies to some of these
problems are outlined. It is argued that although no evaluation methodology is problem-
free, policy makers and researchers should be more con®dent about the merits of using
random assignment, provided it is used in conjunction with other methodologies more
suited to understanding why and how interventions work.
I n t roduct ion
In the UK the New Labour Government's rhetoric on policy-making highlights a concern
with `what works'. The implication is that the policy knowledge base is more important
than, or at least on par with, ideology in developing policies. It follows that evidence of a
high quality is preferable to data that are less valid, reliable or comprehensive. Where
research evidence is used in policy-making the quality of the information used will
largely re¯ect the robustness of methodology adopted. Social policy analysts have a
number of approaches they can use to assess the impacts of social programmes. One of
these methodologies is social experiments, or randomised control trials (RCTs), which
involve randomly assigning people to groups that do and do not receive a programme or
intervention. The estimate of a programme's impact is obtained by comparing the
outcomes (for example, employment, earnings or number of GCSEs attained) for those
participating in the programme with those not in receipt of the intervention. As such
social experiments can address the question: `What works better and in what sense? For
whom? And at what cost?' (Boruch, 1997: 11).
Social experiments have been used in over 200 evaluations of social programmes in
the US covering, for example, welfare-to-work, education and training initiatives, low
income housing assistance and negative income taxes (Greenberg and Schroder, 1997;
Greenberg et al., 1999). They are less widely used in Europe. In Britain, for instance, the
effects of labour market policies are typically measured using quasi-experimental
approaches. Social experiments have been used in only relatively small-scale evaluations
of labour market policies, such as Restart Interviews, 13 week reviews and Jobplan as
well as a few New Deal initiatives (Stafford et al., 2002).
Like all research methodologies random assignment has its pros and cons. This paper
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discusses the use of random assignment and argues that, in conjunction with other
relevant methodologies, it should be more widely used in the UK. The next section
outlines why social experiments are used and their strengths. This is followed by a
discussion of the paradigmatic, technical and practical obstacles to using random
assignment in evaluating social policies.
Soc ia l exper iments
Social experiments are designed to measure the net impact or additionality of a
programme, for example, the average number of additional people in work as a result of
an employment initiative. In measuring net impacts the key evaluation question is what
is the difference between what happened and what would have happened in the
absence of the programme. The latter, known as the counterfactual, is for those
participating in the programme often unobservable, and evaluators have devised a
number of methodologies, including social experiments, to overcome this problem.
In a social experiment people (or, occasionally, areas ± see, for instance, Riccio, J.,
2000) are randomly assigned to one or more action groups who have access to the
programme and one or more control groups, who during the evaluation period are
denied the programme. The control group is the counterfactual, and as such solves the
evaluation problem by providing a group whose outcomes can be observed and
compared to programme invitees. It is the randomisation process that makes the
methodology so potentially powerful, and why experimental designs are regarded by
some, but not all, evaluators as the `gold standard' in evaluation. For if conducted
properly, random assignment produces well-matched samples and consequently avoids
the selection bias inherent in other impact methodologies. As the only differences
between the action and control groups should be attributable to the programme (and
random variation), any observed or unobserved systematic differences (for example, in
motivation, gender or class) that might affect the variation in outcomes between people
in the action and control groups can be discounted in assessing net impacts (provided
the sample is of a suf®cient size). Such factors though will be important in understanding
why and how a programme works, and will need to be explored using non-RCT
methods.
As well as producing unbiased estimates of mean net impacts, social experiments
deliver estimates that are internally valid and researchers can state their degree of
statistical con®dence that the estimate is the `true' measure of the impact of the
intervention (Boruch, 1997; Orr, 1999).
However, the use of randomised experiments is controversial in evaluating social
programmes. There are paradigmatic (at the epistemological and ontological levels),
technical and practical objections to the use of random assignment and these are brie¯y
considered in turn below.
Parad igmat ic ob ject ions to soc ia l exper iments
There are social policy academics and analysts with fundamental objections to the
experimental approach (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Guba and Lincoln, 1989). It is an
approach that can be seen as falling within the `positivistic' tradition, although this term
is not necessarily a useful label because it can be used in a derogatory way. Whilst the
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precise meaning of positivism is not unambiguous (Halfpenny, 1982), it does emphasise
that social researchers should adopt the methodology of the natural sciences and that
there are causal laws to be discovered that will predict and explain social phenomena.
This is seen as requiring the empirical testing of (probabilistic) theories through the
rigorous application of deductive reasoning and objective measurement of events
(Marsh, 1982). Other social science traditions, which fall under a variety of headings
(including humanism, interpretative social science, phenomenology, symbolic inter-
actionism, ethnography and realism) correctly point out that social realities are socially
constructed, focus on understanding the meaning of social action (agency and structure),
and highlight that research is itself a social process with interactions between researcher
and subject (Bauman, 1978; Berger and Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Giddens, 1976).
Such approaches have criticised social experimenters for ignoring the complexities of
social situations. Critically the power relations and nuances of social interaction that can
be vital in in¯uencing the implementation and outcomes of a programme are not
explored in RCTs. Moreover, the theory of causation underlying the experimental
approach is said to be faulty because it does not take account of the causal powers and
liabilities of objects which depending upon the prevailing conditions will have differ-
ential effects (HarreÂ, 1972; Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Sayer, 1984). That is, that the
simple (or successionist) cause? effect model inherent in experiments is inadequate for
understanding social situations, instead it is a starting point for explaining social
phenomena (see HarreÂ, 1972). As a consequence the experimental approach can reveal
what works but not why or how a programme works.
The thrust of this criticism is to some extent acknowledged by proponents of
randomised experiments, and is often referred to as the `black box' problem (Riccio and
Bloom, 2001). Social experiments provide an estimate of the net impact of an interven-
tion in its entirety and cannot explain why programme participants achieved their
observed outcomes. In practice, experimenters attempt to address this by conducting
process studies, multi-group designs and a variety of quasi-experimental statistical
analyses. Process studies use a variety of methodologies (including qualitative techni-
ques) to explore programme awareness and participation, the implementation and
delivery of interventions and the attitudes and experiences of stakeholders (Purdon et al.,
2001). Multi-group designs allow different treatments to be compared with one another
and this helps to reveal what aspects of an intervention are effective (Riccio and Bloom,
2001). The statistical methods used to unpack the `black box' include pooling data in
order to compare similar programmes across different locations and analyses of outcomes
and impacts for sub-groups of participants (Greenberg et al., 2001). These non-
experimental analyses exploit the random samples provided by RCTs to investigate the
differential impacts of a programme on groups of participants and the effect of organisa-
tional, managerial and community/environmental factors on their outcomes/impacts
(Bloom et al., 2001; Riccio and Bloom, 2001).
Notwithstanding the interpretative paradigm's critique of social experiments, it
remains the case that experiments are preferable, indeed for some superior, to non-
experimental methods when measuring the effectiveness of programmes in terms of
outcomes and impacts (Betsey et al., 1985; Boruch, 1997; Fraker and Maynard, 1987;
LaLonde 1986). Their use, therefore, in part depends upon the aims and purposes of an
evaluation: in other words is a measure of additionality required. Social experiments
provide statistical con®dence and precision in estimates of programme effects, but at the
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cost of requiring a high degree of control over interventions as departures from the
random assignment will undermine study ®ndings. More speci®cally there are technical
issues that social analysts must address.
Techn ica l i ssues in conduct in g soc ia l exper iments
All evaluation methodologies have technical limitations on their applicability and
implementation. Social experiments should not be used where it is impossible to
distinguish between the consumption of an intervention by individuals. For example,
with a community-wide programme like a Health Action Zone it is not viable to
randomly assign people living in the same area to action and control groups (Purdon
et al., 2001).
In addition, social experiments provide an unbiased estimate of the average net
impact and not of the distribution of impacts. The estimates do not distinguish between
situations where most people received the average amount and those where a few
bene®t greatly and the majority make small or no gains.
The external validity of a social experiment also needs to be assessed as the social,
political and economic context to the study and the representativeness of the participant
samples may have changed since the experiment commenced.
Moreover, there are a number of potential biases that can undermine RCT estimates
of programme effects, these include (Burtless and Orr, 1986; BjoÈ rklund and RegneÂr,
1996; Cook et al., 1997; Friedlander et al., 1997; Heckman and Smith, 1996; Orr, 1999;
Soloman and Draine, 1995):
. Queuing bias ± which can arise because in a social experiment only a (small)
percentage of the eligible population receives the intervention and this may give
them a comparative advantage (or, depending upon the programme, a relative
disadvantage) to the control group that they would not possess if the programme
was fully implemented. This serves to exaggerate the impact of the programme.
On the other hand, as only a small proportion of the in-scope population receives
the intervention the evaluation may only estimate its partial impacts compared to
when the programme is fully implemented (this is known as the partial equi-
librium effect).
. Substitution bias ± arises when controls access a similar (or, indeed, the actual)
treatment to that received by the action group, but had the evaluation not taken
place they would not have received it. This reduces the `service differential'
between the action and control groups and consequently means that the `true' net
impact will be underestimated.
. Randomisation bias ± occurs if the random assignment itself in¯uences the
behaviour of people. For example, if some people refuse to take part in a
programme because of the use of random assignment this could conceivably limit
the generaliseablity of the study's ®ndings. Whilst others might alter their
behaviour simply because they are participating in a study, rather than because of
the programme itself.
. Disruption bias ± arises if the RCT in¯uences the behaviour of programme staff,
and, say, they manipulate the outcome of the random assignment so affecting
who receives the intervention.
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. Response and attrition bias ± is due to attrition from samples and differential
survey response rates between action and control groups.
The existence of these biases is well know and designers of social experiments can
seek to minimise them through the careful design and execution of studies and
application of statistical techniques (such as the `no-show' correction factor (Orr, 1999)
and the weighting of data). Whilst these are serious potential sources of bias they do not
invalidate the use of social experiments.
Potent ia l opera t iona l p rob lems when us ing random ass ignment
The implementation of experimental designs is not straightforward. The principal
practical dif®culties in the use of random assignment can include:
. opposition to random assignment by service provider staff, volunteers/clients, and
local and national groups;
. the extra `burden' of administering the random assignment;
. low take-up of the programme;
. dif®culties encountered in managing some individuals assigned to the control
group; and
. threats to maintaining the integrity of the random assignment design.
Evaluators of social programmes in the US have had to address these issues and
arguably social policy analysts elsewhere can learn from their experience and so
minimise the potential risks.
O p p o s i t i o n t o t h e u se o f r a n d o m a s s i gn m e n t
American experience shows that resources, time and effort have to be devoted to gaining
acceptance for randomised experiments (Doolittle and Traeger, 1990; Gueron, 1999;
Orr, 1999). Opposition may stem from programme staff, (potential) clients and local and
national organisations. Staff concerns in particular should be taken seriously, as their
cooperation is a prerequisite for a successful evaluation (BjoÈ rklund and RegneÂr, 1996).
There can be extensive and deeply held ethical objections to use of random
assignment. Random assignment can be seen as unfair when, say, the intervention is
regarded as bene®cial and it is denied to members of the control group, even if access to
the programme is only deferred for a set period. The ethics of denying access to controls
needs to be considered in two different experimental contexts: demonstration projects
and on-going policies (Boruch, 1997; Gueron, 1999; Orr, 1999). Ethically, it is easier to
justify using random assignment in evaluations of demonstration projects. This is
because, ®rst, the denial of services to controls leaves them in the same situation as if
there was no evaluation ± existing services remain available to them. Secondly, if the
programme turns out to cause harm or is ineffective, then it is arguably better that it is
tested on a small scale than on the wider population.
For an on-going programme it is harder to justify the denial of an intervention which
would otherwise be available to individuals. However, this has to be weighted against
gains in knowledge about `what works'. Moreover, social experiments may be reason-
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able where resources are scarce and there is an excess demand for a programme, as
random assignment may be a fairer way of allocating resources than some other methods
administrators might adopt, such as ®rst-come, ®rst-served. Or it might be acceptable if
control groups are compensated in some way for their loss. The dif®culty with
compensating control groups is that their response can be uncertain. For example,
relatively high ®nancial recompense might mean control groups can purchase a similar
intervention to that denied, whilst a smaller sum may have no tangible affect on their
behaviour. This may lead to an under- or over-estimate of the programme's effects.
Notwithstanding the experimental context, there is an onus on the evaluators and
project funders to minimise the risk of personal loss to the client group. In seeking to
alleviate people's concerns US evaluators usually point out that the ®ndings from the
evaluation will be of bene®t to the client group (as well as to taxpayers) as it will highlight
what works (Boruch, 1997; Gueron, 1999; Newman and Brown, 1996; Orr, 1999). It
can be argued that it would be unethical to allow potential programme clients to receive
an ineffective and poorly evaluated service. Indeed, an outcome will be better social
policy.
There is also the assurance that informed consent is required before random assign-
ment is conducted. For vulnerable groups evaluators can request that parents/guardians
and/or staff from referral agencies be present during the initial meeting when informed
consent to participate is sought.
If ethical objections are keenly held then evaluators can modify the experimental
design, for example, exempting certain sub-groups from the random assignment,
allowing staff a limited number of discretionary exemptions for clients they judge in dire
need of the intervention, shortening the embargo period, and providing control group
members with a list of non-programme services. The latter may limit more pro-active
advice giving by staff, and avoid staff turning people away empty handed. However, the
extent to which such lists lead members of control groups to access services that they
would not otherwise have used biases any impact estimates. Although not ideal, issuing
lists of alternative services/treatments is a widespread practice.
In addition, staff delivering the programme may feel that the experiment has nothing
to offer the service provider. Nevertheless, the programme being evaluated must be
administered in the `normal way'; both non-cooperative and over-enthusiastic staff can
undermine an evaluation. The US literature on social experiments includes suggestions
for engendering the support and cooperation of provider organisations, such as, agreeing
to provide it with interim and summary results, and showing that random assignment has
worked elsewhere (Stafford et al., 2002). Providers may also be keen to cooperate
because evidence from the evaluation may help them to secure funding for the same (or
a similar) programme after the evaluation.
E x t r a b u r d e n o f a d m i n i s t e r i n g r a n d o m a s s i g n m e n t
Administering random assignments will place an additional burden on service providers.
However, experimenters can often explore measures to reduce the load on organisations,
such as, integrating the random assignment procedures with the service provider's own
proposed application process and conducting the random assignment procedure early
on in the application process (Orr, 1999).
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L o w t a k e - u p
There is a risk that take-up of programmes involving random assignment will be lower
than anticipated. This could lead to insuf®cient sample sizes, which in turn reduces the
statistical power of the evaluation (Doolittle and Treager, 1990; Heckman and Smith,
1996). Or, programmes may admit applicants who they would not `ordinarily' take on,
so diminishing the performance of the programme. Failure to estimate correctly the size
of the target population and participation rates has been a feature of US employment and
training programmes (Boruch, 1997).
Nevertheless there are a variety of recruitment methods to attract potential clients to
a programme. Methods used in the US include:
. conducting a feasibility study to investigate the likely number of applicants;
. targeted mailings;
. adjusting temporarily or permanently the treatment group/control group ratio to
allow more people to receive the intervention;
. providing staff with specialist training in marketing;
. extending the time period over which recruitment takes place;
. offering ®nancial and other inducements (e.g. gifts, entry to a prize draw) for
taking part. (Any incentive must be made available to all members of the control
and intervention groups); and
. providing feedback to organisations on the progress of any clients they refer to the
programme.
M a n a g i n g c o n t r o l s
Staff may be concerned about how to deal with complaints about the use of random
assignment (especially from those assigned to a control group). Failure to have proce-
dures to deal with applicants' complaints can lead to staff referring controls to other
sources of information or services they would not otherwise have received. As already
mentioned, such contamination of the control group will bias the estimates of the impact
of the programme. Minimising control group contamination requires staff to understand
and accept that there are limits to the information they can give to controls.
Possible mechanisms for minimising complaints include, ®rst, holding a pre-random
assignment orientation session where it is explained that receipt of the intervention is a
lottery and that random assignment is a fair method of allocation (Stafford et al., 2002).
Secondly, ensuring that front-line staff have the skills and expertise to establish rapport
with clients, especially vulnerable applicants (Boruch, 1997). This may involve agreeing
beforehand what the staff is going to tell aggrieved applicants and providing them with
scripts, and/or videos and other guidance.
M a i n t a i n i n g t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e r a n d o m a ss i g n m e n t
The integrity of the random assignment must be maintained for the duration of the
project (Gueron, 1999). However, it is almost inevitable that some members of the
control group receive a similar or the same service as those in the intervention group
(Friedlander et al., 1997). In addition, substitution bias (see above) can occur if the very
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existence of the programme alters the services that are available to members of the
control group. This would occur, for example, if the intervention leads to more places in
conventional services being available to the control group because members of the
action group are no longer using them.
Development of random assignment procedures involves evaluators agreeing with
providers the protocols and procedures for quality assurance. These may encompass
monitoring and policing the delivery of the intervention, piloting procedures, observing
the random assignment, checking the baseline characteristics of the action and control
groups and monitoring the build-up of the sample on a weekly basis (Stafford et al.,
2002).
There are practical problems to be overcome in using social experiments. However,
the evidence from the US is that they can be minimised with careful planning and
execution of RCTs (Stafford et al., 2002).
Conc lus ion
This paper has considered some of the objections to random assignment and has
attempted to highlight how they might be addressed. Nevertheless, the use of social
experimentation in the UK is controversial. For example, the current phase of the New
Deal for Disabled People was originally to be evaluated by a study that incorporated a
randomised experiment. Much to the delight of critics of social experiments the
Government announced the abandonment of this aspect of the evaluation on the 10th
December 2001 (Prasad, 2002).
The challenges evaluators confront in applying randomised experimental designs are
formidable. However, the paradigmatic, technical and practical concerns about social
experiments are not fatal, provided the evaluation strategy includes other methods that
explore key why and how research questions (Macdonald, 1999; Cronbach, 1982; Rossi
and Freeman, 1985). Such a pluralistic approach to social policy evaluation re¯ects the
complexity of social phenomenon and allows the impacts of schemes to be measured
and understood. Social experiments are a powerful methodology which social policy
analysts should use when appropriate, not for their own sake, but because RCTs that are
properly designed and executed are capable of letting us know what works, with
con®dence.
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